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An auction is said to be externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave
the remaining bidders’ payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist
even if externalities between bidders arise from certain types of interdependent preferences.
One important example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which are frequently
used to explain overbidding in auctions. Another important example are cross-shareholdings
between firms that compete in an auction. For the independent private values model, we
derive an auction that coincides with the second-price auction (SPA) in terms of efficiency
and expected revenue, and, in contrast to the second-price auction, is also externality-
robust. The externality-robust auction (ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful
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1 Introduction
When Vickrey (1961) first described the second-price sealed-bid auction (SPA), his goal was to
devise a selling mechanism that achieves Pareto efficiency in private information environments,
without requiring too much strategic sophistication of the agents. Since truth-telling is a domi-
nant strategy in the SPA, every “bidder can confine his efforts and attention to an appraisal of
the value the article would have in his own hands, at a considerable saving in mental strain”
(Vickrey, 1961, p. 22). Hence a certain notion of robustness – with respect to knowledge and
beliefs, see Bergemann and Morris (2005) – is an important argument in favor of the SPA.
Experimental studies reveal, however, that the actual performance of the SPA can differ quite
substantially from the theoretical prediction (Kagel, 1995): overbidding is regularly observed,
such that Pareto efficiency of the outcome is not guaranteed. Explaining this finding is intricate.
Most behavioral models that predict overbidding in auction formats like the first-price sealed-bid
auction (FPA) fail to do so in the SPA, precisely because of its dominance property.1 Among the
remaining candidates that can explain overbidding in the SPA, spiteful preferences have received
much attention (e.g. Morgan et al., 2003; Brandt et al., 2007). Spiteful bidders have an incentive
to overbid because the own bid can affect the price a winning opponent has to pay in an SPA. The
experimental literature has presented some evidence for the presence of a spite motive among
bidders in auctions (Andreoni et al., 2007; Cooper and Fang, 2008; Nishimura et al., 2011).2
Given these empirical findings, robustness with respect to interdependent preferences might not
be of lesser importance in practice than robustness as captured by dominant strategies.
Psychological motives like spite are just one possible reason for why bidders’ preferences in
auctions can be interdependent. In several real-world auctions, bidders are firms who also hold
shares of their competitors (Ettinger, 2003; Dasgupta and Tsui, 2004; Chillemi, 2005; Ettinger,
2008). Such cross-shareholdings imply that firms take into account the effect of their bidding
behavior on others’ profits, which generates an interdependency comparable to altruism in the
psychological domain. The SPA is especially fragile to such motives. Bidders who participate
in the profits of their opponents will have an incentive to underbid (Dasgupta and Tsui, 2004).
1This holds for models of risk aversion (Cox et al., 1988), anticipated regret (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007),
level-k thinking (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007; Crawford et al., 2009), quantal response equilibrium (Goeree et al.,
2002), impulse balance equilibrium (Ockenfels and Selten, 2005), or interim rationalizability (Battigalli and
Siniscalchi, 2003).
2Cooper and Fang (2008) show that, in addition to spitefulness, both joy of winning (Roider and Schmitz,
2011) and imperfect learning help to explain their findings. Lange and Ratan (2010) propose a specific form of
loss aversion as a driver of overbidding and discuss resulting differences between lab experiments and the field.
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Consequently, the SPA again ceases to be Pareto efficient and the auctioneer additionally suffers
from reduced revenues (Ettinger, 2003; Chillemi, 2005). In summary, an auction design that
avoids the negative effects of externalities could be valuable in a large range of applications.
The contribution of this paper is to provide such an auction format and to test it in a laboratory
experiment.
In a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs,
Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012) have introduced the concept of externality-robustness.3 Suppose
that the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a mechanism satisfies that unilateral deviations (e.g. to over-
bidding or underbidding in an auction) leave the expected payoffs of all non-deviating agents
unaffected. Such an equilibrium will continue to exist for quite general preference interdepen-
dencies, because bidders cannot manipulate each others’ payoffs. The class of externalities for
which robustness is implied contains spitefulness and cross-shareholdings, and various other
motives such as inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or
intention-based social preferences (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). Bierbrauer
and Netzer (2012) show that externality-robustness is equivalent to an insurance property of the
(incentive-compatible) social choice function to be implemented, i.e., the agents’ payoffs have to
be ex-ante insured against the randomness in the other agents’ types. This property is similar to
concepts of insurance in auctions with risk-averse agents (e.g. Maskin and Riley, 1984) and with
ambiguity-averse agents (e.g. Bose et al., 2006), but it serves a very different purpose here. In-
surance is relevant with risk-averse agents (albeit not generally optimal, see Matthews, 1983, and
Maskin and Riley, 1984) for the conventional reasons, and it is relevant with ambiguity-averse
agents (and also optimal, see Bose et al., 2006) because providing insurance on the worst-case
prior allows the seller to extract revenue from the agents. In the present context, insurance is
relevant because it protects an agent against other agents’ attempts to manipulate her payoffs,
and hence it protects the equilibrium against payoff externalities.4
Given the degrees of freedom in designing ex-post transfers of Bayesian incentive-compatible
mechanisms, it is in fact possible to make any mechanism externality-robust without changing
3Due to their focus on intention-based social preferences, Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012) use the expression
“psychological robustness”, but the concept is also applicable to externalities that are not due to psychological
considerations. Netzer and Volk (2013) investigate robustness and ex-post implementation in a framework with
intention-based social preferences.
4See Bose et al. (2006, p. 424f) for a careful discussion of the different concepts of insurance in auctions. Esö
and Futo (1999) have investigated the different problem of insuring the auctioneer against randomness in the
revenue. See also Börgers and Norman (2009). Bellemare and Sebald (2011) apply a related invariance property
to experimentally infer about belief-dependent preferences.
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either its allocation rule or its expected revenue. In this paper, we apply a transformation – the
details of which are explained in Section 2.2 – to the SPA to obtain its robust counterpart, the
externality-robust auction (ERA). We show that the ERA corresponds to a first price auction
augmented by bonus payments to elicit larger bids. Specifically, every bidder obtains a bonus
that is increasing in the own bid, but independent of the others’ bids and the event of winning
or losing. The bonus schedule is designed so as to induce truthful bidding. Unilateral deviations
from truthful bidding then have no effect on the other bidders’ payoffs, because (i) their bonus
payment is unaffected and (ii) winning the auction generates no additional rents that can be
manipulated. It turns out that this auction format corresponds to the “Santa Claus” auction as
described by Riley and Samuelson (1981).5 They introduce it to illustrate revenue equivalence
beyond the usual class of auctions, but they do not observe its desirable properties in the presence
of externalities, which is our focus in this paper. We will discuss the relation of the ERA to
several real-world auction formats in Section 2.6.
The theoretical arguments suggest several hypotheses about bidding behavior in the SPA
and the ERA, which we test experimentally in the second part of the paper. First and foremost,
we expect to find overbidding in the SPA but less overbidding in the ERA, since spitefulness
among experimental subjects can manifest itself in overbidding in the SPA but not in the ERA.
We conducted treatments for both auction types, relying on a between subjects design where
participants are anonymously and randomly rematched in groups of two bidders in each of 24
rounds, their private value being determined anew every round by an independent draw from
a uniform distribution. The results confirm our main hypothesis. There is overbidding in the
SPA: bids are on average about 10 percent above values. Average overbidding in the ERA, by
contrast, is not different from zero. Indeed, bids are on average even a tiny amount (0:4 percent)
below values. The difference in average overbidding between SPA and ERA is highly significant.
To test for the impact of spiteful preferences more directly, we conducted additional control
treatments where subjects interact with the computer instead of another subject, which also
eliminates the possibility that bidding behavior is driven by attempts to influence the payoff of
another bidder.6 As predicted by the spite hypothesis, we find that overbidding is significantly
5Differences are the reserve price and the continuous valuations in Riley and Samuelson (1981). Bose et al.
(2006, p. 422) describe an analogous auction where the bonus schedule depends on the degree of ambiguity and
which converges to the Santa Claus auction as ambiguity vanishes. Matthews (1983) describes an auction where
a bonus is paid to high bidders while low bidders have to make payments to the auctioneer.
6Replacing human opponents by a computer is a standard experimental technique to eliminate social contexts,
see e.g. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) for a trust game and van den Bos et al. (2008) for a common value auction.
The SPA with a computer bidder is a variant of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (Becker et al., 1964).
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reduced (to about 4 percent) in the SPA against the computer, and it remains indistinguishable
from zero in the ERA against the computer (0:1 percent). To separate spitefulness from other
possible explanations of overbidding and to understand individual heterogeneity, we administered
a Raven Progressive Matrices test (Raven et al., 2007), which measures cognitive skills. We also
collected a measure of the subjects’ joy of winning, using a procedure due to Sheremeta (2010),
where money can be invested to win a contest with no monetary prize. Joy of winning turns
out to be positively correlated with bidding in all four treatments (although significantly so only
in two of the four treatments). Cognitive skills have a significant impact on bidding only in
the SPA, where better cognitive skills are associated with less overbidding. The distinguishing
feature of the SPA from the other three treatments is the existence of another bidder whose
payoff can be manipulated. Here we speculate that cognitive skills might serve as a proxy
measure for less spiteful preferences in our analysis, which is supported by existing evidence
that has documented a positive correlation between cognitive skills and pro-social behavior (e.g.
Burks et al., 2009; Millet and Dewitte, 2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical analysis.
Section 3 describes the experimental design. Our hypotheses are formulated in Section 4. The
empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs
and the experimental instructions.
2 Theoretical Analysis
2.1 Formal Framework
Framework and notation introduced below are a special case of the mechanism design approach
in Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012). The problem is to allocate one unit of an indivisible object
among risk-neutral bidders with private information about their willingness to pay. The set of
bidders is I = f1; : : : ; ng, n  2. Bidder i’s valuation of the object is denoted by i 2 i.
Let  = (1; : : : ; n) 2  = 1  : : :  n denote the profile of valuations of all bidders. The
expression  = (i;  i) will be used when convenient. Bidder i’s valuation is drawn randomly
from the set i = f1; : : : ; mg  R, where m  2 and 0  1 < 2 < : : : < m. Valuations are
drawn independently and identically across bidders, according to strictly positive probabilities
p1; p2; : : : ; pm. Cumulated probabilities are denoted by P k =
Pk
j=1 p
j , k = 0; 1; : : : ;m, so that
P 0 = 0 and Pm = 1. Let Q = f(q1; : : : ; qn) 2 [0; 1]nj
Pn
i=1 qi = 1g be the set of possible outcome
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decisions, where q = (q1; : : : ; qn) 2 Q are the winning probabilities for each bidder. Let T = Rn
be the set of all possible transfers. A profile t = (t1; : : : ; tn) 2 T prescribes the transfers paid to
each bidder, where negative transfers amount to payments made by the corresponding bidder.
Altogether, A = Q  T is the set of possible allocations. Bidder i’s material payoff from an
allocation is given by i(qi; ti; i) = qii + ti.
In this environment, a social choice function (SCF) is a mapping f :  ! A which assigns
an allocation f() 2 A to every profile  2 . The notation f = (qf1 ; : : : ; qfn; tf1 ; : : : ; tfn) will
also be used, so that qfi () is the winning probability and t
f
i () is the transfer to bidder i under
the SCF f , given valuations . The SCF fSPA which is underlying the second-price sealed-bid
auction is described as follows. For any given profile of valuations , let W ()  I be the set of
bidders with maximal valuation in  = (1; : : : ; n). Furthermore, let s() be the second-largest
valuation in . Whenever jW ()j = 1, so that there is a single bidder with largest valuation, s()
is strictly smaller than this largest valuation. Whenever jW ()j > 1, so several bidders have the
same largest valuation, s() is identical to this largest valuation. Now define
qi () =
8><>: 1=jW ()j if i 2W ();0 if i =2W (); (1)
which implies that the object is allocated with equal probabilities among all bidders with largest
valuation. Transfers are defined by
tSPAi () =
8><>:  s()=jW ()j if i 2W ();0 if i =2W (); (2)
which states that the winner has to pay the second-largest valuation (adjusted for randomly
broken ties). The direct mechanism for fSPA = (q1; : : : ; qn; tSPA1 ; : : : ; tSPAn ), where each bidder
is asked for a bid from i and the outcome is determined by fSPA, is called the second-price
sealed-bid auction, or the Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961). It is a special case from the class
of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms (e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995, ch. 23), so that truthful
bidding (making bids equal to the true value) is a weakly dominant strategy for every bidder.7
7Truthful bidding is, however, not the unique equilibrium. See Blume and Heidhues (2004) for a complete
characterization of the equilibrium structure. The focus on equilibrium existence but not uniqueness in mechanism
design theory is often justified by the argument that the mechanism designer can suggest a particular equilibrium
to the players.
5
2.2 Externality-Robustness
While the dominance of truthful bidding is an important advantage of the SPA, it has the
disadvantage of being vulnerable to externalities. This can be illustrated in a simple example.
Assume n = 2 and m = 2. Let i = f1; 2g be the set of possible valuations, and write p1 = p
and p2 = 1   p, where 0 < p < 1. Assume also that bidder 2 in fact bids truthfully. It is an
easy exercise to derive the ex-ante expected payoff pairs that bidder 1 can induce for herself and
the opponent by varying her own strategy. Truthful bidding yields the maximal expected payoff
p(1  p) for bidder 1. Deviations to always bidding low (underbidding) or always bidding high
(overbidding) reduce this expected payoff to p(1   p)=2. The effect on bidder 2 is as follows.
Truthful bidding yields p(1 p) also for bidder 2. If bidder 1 deviates to underbidding, however,
the expected payoff of bidder 2 increases to (1   p). Overbidding, on the other hand, reduces
bidder 2’s expected payoff to 0. Now suppose that bidder 1 is not selfish but maximizes a
weighted sum of the own and the opponent’s payoff, with weight  placed on the opponent.
Then underbidding will be preferable to truthful bidding whenever  > [p=(1   p)]=2. This
could correspond to a case with a sufficiently large share  of holdings in the opponent firm
(Ettinger, 2003; Dasgupta and Tsui, 2004; Chillemi, 2005). Overbidding, on the other hand,
becomes more attractive than truth-telling whenever  <  1=2, which could correspond to a
case of sufficiently strong spitefulness (Morgan et al., 2003; Brandt et al., 2007).
The problem arises because bidder 1’s strategy choice affects the payoff of bidder 2. Suppose
that, in a different auction format, bidder 1 did not have the opportunity to manipulate the
payoff of bidder 2 through a unilateral deviation from truthful bidding, and suppose further that
truthful bidding was still a selfish best response for bidder 1. In such an auction, the incentive to
bid truthfully would not be destroyed by pro- or anti-social concerns. Following Bierbrauer and
Netzer (2012), we say that an SCF is externality-robust if it is (i) Bayesian incentive-compatible,
i.e., truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the direct mechanism, and (ii) it satisfies that
unilateral deviations from this equilibrium have no impact on the expected payoffs of all the
other players. Bierbrauer and Netzer (2012, Theorem 3) show that it is possible to start from
an arbitrary Bayesian incentive-compatible SCF f and to construct an externality-robust SCF
f that coincides with f in terms of the decision rule (qf1 ; : : : ; q
f
n), the expected surplus, and the
interim expected payoffs of all agents. For the setup considered here, the construction of the
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new transfers (t
f
1 ; : : : ; t
f
n) is given by
t
f
i () = E i
h
qfi (i;  i) i + t
f
i (i;  i)
i
  qfi () i: (3)
Hence when valuations are  = (i;  i), bidder i obtains a transfer that corresponds to her
entire interim expected payoff under f , given valuation i, minus the actual ex-post utility in
case of winning the object. Bose et al. (2006) and Bodoh-Creed (2012) apply an analogous
construction in a model framework where bidders have ambiguous beliefs about the others’
values. The expectation in (3) is then taken with respect to bidder i’s worst-case prior, which
provides insurance to the bidder and at the same time increases revenues to the seller.
2.3 The Externality-Robust Auction
The procedure described in the previous section can be applied to fSPA to obtain its externality-
robust counterpart fERA. Since the efficient decision rule (q1; : : : ; qn) is adopted without mod-
ifications, the following proposition only describes the modified transfers.
Proposition 1. In the externality-robust auction fERA, transfers are given by
tERAi () = B(i) +
8><>:  i=jW ()j if i 2W ();0 if i =2W (); (4)
where
B(i) =
k 1X
j=1
 
P j
n 1  
j+1   j (5)
for k such that i = k.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Consider the simultaneous sealed-bid auction given by the direct mechanism for fERA. With-
out the additional term B(i) in the transfers (4), it would correspond to an FPA where bidders
are required to submit bids and the winner pays the own bid. In the simple FPA, bidders
would shade their bids (report less than their true valuation) with the goal of earning rents in
case of winning, but the bonus function B(i) defined in (5) restores incentives to report the
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valuation truthfully.8 The bonus takes a value of zero for the smallest possible bid, it is strictly
increasing, and it does not depend on the opponents’ bids or the event of winning or losing the
auction. Externality-robustness now holds because, first, the bonus B(i) received by bidder i
cannot be influenced by any opponent, and, second, there are no additional rents that can be
manipulated by manipulating the identity of the winner, as the true valuation is paid by the
winner in equilibrium.
Three qualifications are appropriate. First, our approach relies on an idea of robustness,
not of optimal auction design. If the exact nature of externalities between bidders is known, an
auction tailored to the situation can achieve larger revenues. Our analysis applies to situations
where such information requirements are excessive, for instance due to unobserved heterogeneity
in bidders’ (anti-)social preferences, or firm ownership structures that are hard to disentangle
or unobservable to the outsider.9 Second, a disadvantage of the ERA is that it no longer has
dominant strategies, and the optimal bonus schedule depends on the prior distribution of values.
In light of the discussion in the introduction, however, a trade-off between different notions
of robustness seems inevitable and might have to be resolved differently from case to case.10
Third, the literature has investigated a large range of different externalities in auctions (Jehiel
and Moldovanu, 2006). Not all of them are captured by the notion of externality-robustness
considered here, which eliminates externalities based on overall payoffs. Bidders still have the
discretion to manipulate the identity of the winner, which can be relevant in other applications
(Jehiel et al., 1996). The same holds for externalities arising from types to the losers of an
auction (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2000) and directly from prices (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1994;
Maasland and Onderstal, 2007) as in knockout auctions (Graham and Marshall, 1987; McAfee
and McMillan, 1992) or auctions that are used to finance public goods (Goeree et al., 2005; Engers
and McManus, 2007). Finally, externalities can arise from toeholds in takeovers (Burkart, 1995;
Singh, 1998; Bulow et al., 1999; Ettinger, 2008), which is also not addressed by the ERA.
8The strategy of bidding more than the true valuation, to receive a larger bonus, is unattractive due to the
threat of actually having to pay the higher bid in the event of winning the auction. The bonus function for n = 2
in Riley and Samuelson (1981, p. 387) is
R b
v F (v)dv, where b is the bid, v is the reserve price, and F is the cdf
of the valuations. Riley and Samuelson (1979) contains the generalization to n  2 bidders.
9See e.g. Chillemi (2005) and Loyola (2007) for optimal auctions with known cross-shareholdings, Lu (2012)
for financial externalities, and Tang and Sandholm (2012) for spiteful bidders. As an alternative to externality-
robustness, a multi-dimensional mechanism design problem could be considered if externalities are not observable.
These problems are often intractable, and they still require substantial knowledge of the class of externalities
that will not be available in many situations.
10Segal and Sobel (2007) propose a concept which speaks to both notions of robustness at once, by requiring the
opponent in a two-player game to be indifferent between the conventionally defined dominated and dominating
strategy for all own strategies. For the purpose of mechanism design, this concept appears overly demanding.
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2.4 Example
To get a better understanding of the properties of B(i), suppose that i = f1; :::;mg and that
values are uniformly distributed. The bonus function can now be written as
B(k) =
k 1X
j=1

j
m
n 1
;
which is a strictly convex function of the bid k. For m = 100, as in our following experiment,
it is depicted in Figure 1 for the three cases of n = 2, n = 4 and n = 20. With two competing
bidders, as in the experiment, a bid of 50, for instance, is rewarded by a bonus of 12:25, a bid of
80 is rewarded by a bonus of 31:6, and the maximal bid of 100 is rewarded by a bonus of 49:5.
Figure 1: Bonus Function
Returning to the example from Section 2.2 (n = m = 2, p1 = p, p2 = 1   p), it follows
that B(1) = 0 and B(2) = p. Table 1 compares the SPA to the ERA for this case. Each row
in the table corresponds to one of the four possible profiles of values. The efficient decision
rule is identical for both auctions. The table then contains the transfers of the SPA and the
ERA, as well as their generated ex-post revenues. For the ERA, straightforward calculations
show that, conditional on bidder 2 bidding truthfully, bidder 1 still achieves the maximal own
expected payoff of p(1 p) by also bidding truthfully, while both over- and underbidding reduce
this payoff to p(1  p)=2. In contrast to the SPA, however, bidder 2 can always expect to obtain
p(1  p), irrespective of bidder 1’s behavior.
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Table 1: Comparison of SPA and ERA
1 2 q

1 q

2 t
SPA
1 t
SPA
2 Revenue tERA1 tERA2 Revenue
1 1 1=2 1=2  1=2  1=2 1  1=2  1=2 1
1 2 0 1 0  1 1 0 p  2 2  p
2 1 1 0  1 0 1 p  2 0 2  p
2 2 1=2 1=2  1  1 2 p  1 p  1 2(1  p)
2.5 Ex-Post Revenues
The ERA generates the same expected revenue as the SPA with selfish bidders, which follows from
the revenue equivalence principle, but their ex-post revenues differ. In particular, the ex-post
revenue of the SPA is always non-negative. This is not necessarily the case for the ERA, where
the auctioneer makes payments to the bidders so that ex-post deficits might become possible.
It will be shown in the following that deficits remain impossible in the case with uniformly
distributed values, but cannot be ruled out in some more general environments.
Recall that B(i) is increasing in i. To rule out deficits for all possible valuation profiles
 2 , it therefore suffices to check the cases where all bidders have the same valuation: i = k
for some k 2 f1; : : : ;mg and all i 2 I. These are worst-case scenarios for the auctioneer, because
overall bonus payments are maximal among all valuation profiles that yield a gross revenue of
k. Hence it suffices to check whether or not
nB(k)  k (6)
holds for all k 2 f1; : : : ;mg, where the LHS captures the bonus sum and the RHS is gross
revenue collected. As a next step, it can be shown that condition (6) is most stringent for the
largest possible value m, a consequence of convexity of the bonus function (see Appendix A.2).
Thus, the ERA never runs a deficit if and only if
nB(m)  m: (7)
For the framework introduced in Section 2.4, condition (7) can be verified (again Appendix
A.2), which shows that ex-post deficits are impossible with uniformly distributed (equidistant)
values. Deficits become possible in more general frameworks, however. For instance, assume
n = 2 and m = 3 within the previous framework, but deviate from the assumption of a uniform
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distribution. For concreteness, let p1 = 1   , p2 = =2 and p3 = =2. It can be shown that
(7) is violated whenever  < 1=3. If high valuations are unlikely, bonus payments must be
especially large for high bids, to ensure incentive-compatibility. Otherwise, high-value bidders
would be tempted to underbid and still win with sufficiently large probability. If several bidders
simultaneously have such high valuations, this will lead to a deficit.
2.6 Real-World Auctions
The distinguishing feature of the ERA is that bonus payments are made to all bidders. In this
regard it is related to several real-world auction formats in which the transfers to non-winning
bidders are different from zero.11 First, this also holds in all-pay auctions (Goeree et al., 2005),
albeit with opposite sign. There, non-winning bidders have to pay their bid, while they receive
a payment related to their bid in the ERA. Second, in some auctions a share of the revenue
is distributed back to the bidders (Graham and Marshall, 1987; McAfee and McMillan, 1992;
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1994; Maasland and Onderstal, 2007). Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994), for
instance, describes how the heirs bid for an estate and divide the winner’s payment among
themselves. In such auctions, however, the transfer to an unsuccessful bidder depends on the
winning bid instead of the own bid, which reinforces the opportunity to affect each others’ payoffs
by over- or underbidding. Finally, the literature has investigated premium auctions such as the
different versions of the Amsterdam auction (Goeree and Offerman, 2004; Hu et al., 2011). They
are most closely related to the ERA because they reward a premium to a non-winning bidder
with the goal of raising equilibrium bids. In the first-price Amsterdam auction, for instance, the
highest bidders wins and pays the own bid, while both winner and second-highest bidder receive
a premium that is increasing in the second-highest bid.12 There are two main differences to the
ERA. First, not all bidders obtain the premium, and, second, the size of the premium does not
depend on the own bid alone. Unilateral deviations from equilibrium behavior will therefore
again influence the payoffs of the other bidders.
11The literature has also investigated bonus auctions in which an individual-specific bonus is awarded only to
the winner, in form of a discount on the price that has to be paid (Mares and Swinkels, 2011).
12More precisely, an elimination stage takes place first, where the price increases until only two bidders are
left. An FPA is then conducted among these two bidders, where the premium depends linearly on the difference
between the second-highest bid and the price at which the first stage concluded. There also exists a second-price
version of the Amsterdam auction. See Goeree and Offerman (2004) for more details and a formal analysis.
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3 Experimental Design
We conducted four different treatments, a second-price auction, an externality-robust auction,
and two corresponding auction formats in which subjects interacted with a computer instead of
interacting with another subject.
3.1 Second-Price Auction (SPA)
Treatment SPA is a standard second-price auction, repeated for 24 rounds. Subjects are anony-
mously and randomly rematched in two-person groups in each round.13 Each bidder first ob-
serves her private value but not the value of the matched bidder. Values are drawn independently
across bidders and rounds according to a uniform distribution from i = f1; : : : ; 100g, which is
common knowledge. Both bidders in a group then simultaneously submit their bids, which can
be any value from i. The bidder who submits the higher bid wins the auction. She receives her
private value and pays the bid of the losing bidder. The payoff of the losing bidder is zero. Ties
are resolved randomly with equal probability. Feedback is given at the end of each round, where
each bidder is reminded of her own valuation, the own bid, the bid of the competing bidder, and
the resulting own payoff in the period. Then the next round begins.
3.2 Second-Price Auction against the Computer (SPA-C)
Subjects in treatment SPA-C face a single-agent decision problem. In contrast to treatment SPA,
bidders are not matched in two-person groups but interact with computers that draw random
numbers from i = f1; : : : ; 100g. Otherwise, the two treatments are identical. If the bid of
a subject exceeds the random number, the subject wins the auction. She receives her private
value and pays a price that equals the random number. The subject’s payoff is zero if her bid
falls short of the random number. Ties are resolved randomly with equal probability. Bidders
are informed in the beginning that the random numbers of the computer correspond to the bids
of subjects in a past auction that we conducted in the same lab and that was identical except
for the fact that two bidders competed for winning. Indeed, we conducted one session of SPA-C
for each session of SPA with the exact same realization of own values and others’ bids. That is,
for each subject in SPA-C there is a subject in SPA who had the same sequence of values in the
24 rounds. Moreover, the subject in SPA-C receives a sequence of random numbers from the
13Since we had between 30 and 36 subjects per session, repeated game effects should be absent.
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computer that equals the sequence of bids that the corresponding subject in SPA received from
the respective other bidders.
3.3 Externality-Robust Auction (ERA)
Treatment ERA is an implementation of the externality-robust auction. As in SPA, the auction
is repeated with random rematching for 24 rounds, and values are drawn independently and
uniformly from i = f1; : : : ; 100g. The only difference between SPA and ERA are the auction
rules that determine the payoffs. In ERA, the bidder with the highest bid wins and receives her
private value as in SPA, but now she pays her own bid and receives the bonus that corresponds
to her own bid as given in (5). The bidder with the lower bid also receives the bonus that
corresponds to her own bid.
3.4 Externality-Robust Auction against the Computer (ERA-C)
Subjects in treatment ERA-C again face a single-agent decision problem because they interact
with the computer. The treatments ERA and ERA-C are identical otherwise, so that the relation
between ERA and ERA-C is the same as the relation between SPA and SPA-C.
3.5 Additional Measurements
In each session we elicited two additional individual characteristics after the 24 rounds of the
respective auction format were completed. To measure a subject’s “joy of winning”, we conducted
a short treatment in which the subject could win a contest against the computer. Each subject
received an additional endowment of 20 points that could be spent to win the contest. After the
subject’s decision how many points to spend, the computer draws an integer from f0; : : : ; 20g
according to a uniform distribution. The subject wins the contest if the number of points
spent exceeds the randomly drawn integer. Ties are randomly resolved with equal probability.
Importantly, winning is merely symbolic, i.e., it does not carry a financial gain. A subject’s payoff
is thus given by 20 points minus the number of invested points, irrespective of the outcome of
the contest. We take the number of points spent to win as a measure of the subject’s joy of
winning. This approach of measuring joy of winning follows Sheremeta (2010).14
14In Sheremeta (2010), two subjects compete with each other to win a contest with no monetary reward. We
implemented a contest against the computer to separate our measure of joy of winning from more complicated
motives, such as spiteful attempts to interfere with another subject’s joy of winning.
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To measure the subjects’ “cognitive skills”, we administered a computerized 12-item Raven
Progressive Matrices test (Raven et al., 2007). The Raven test is a widely used IQ test, based
on problems the solutions to which neither depend on knowledge nor on verbal skills. Each
item presents a 3  3 matrix of abstract figures, where one figure is missing. Subjects have
to determine the missing figure out of eight given solution possibilities. Identifying the correct
solution requires reasoning about patterns across both rows and columns. The problems become
more difficult over the course of the 12 items. Before the subjects could start working on the
test, they first had to correctly solve two practice items to ensure the understanding of the test.
After a subject correctly solved the two test items, she had 12 minutes to complete the 12 main
items. Feedback for the main items was given only in the end. The performance in the Raven
test and the measure of joy of winning serve as control variables in our analysis of the subjects’
bidding behavior.
3.6 General Procedures
We conducted two sessions for each of the four treatments, with 272 subjects in total. 70
subjects participated in treatment SPA, 70 subjects participated in treatment ERA, and 64 and
68 subjects participated in the respective computer treatments. In each session we implemented
three matching groups of size 10 to 12, depending of the number of subjects in a session, which
varied due to no-shows between 30 and 36. The experiment was computerized with the software
“z-Tree” (Fischbacher, 2007) and took place at the decision laboratory of the Department of
Economics at the University of Zurich in 2013. Subjects were mainly students from the University
of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. Each subject participated in
only one session, which lasted about 90 minutes.
The instructions for the auctions were handed out to the subjects and included comprehen-
sion questions that had to be answered correctly before the experiment could begin. A summary
of the instructions was read aloud to ensure common knowledge. An English translation of the
original German instructions for all four treatments can be found in Appendix A.3. The bonus
function of the externality-robust auction was presented to the subjects on a supplementary
information sheet, both in form of a table and as a diagram. The instructions for the two
measurement tasks were provided directly on the computer screens. Payoffs from the auctions,
denominated in “points”, were converted into money at the rate of 4 points to CHF 1 (about $
1.05). Four rounds were randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. In the joy
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of winning task points were converted in CHF at a rate of 10 to 1. We incentivized the Raven
test by paying CHF 1 for each correctly solved item, in order not to confound our measure
of cognitive skills with a subject’s intrinsic motivation to participate in the test. On average,
subjects earned CHF 33.30 in total, which includes a show-up fee of CHF 10.15
4 Hypotheses
If spiteful preferences are one (or the only) reason for overbidding in the SPA, we should observe
less (or no) overbidding in the ERA, which is designed such that bidders cannot influence each
others’ payoffs. Spiteful preferences should therefore not affect the subjects’ bidding behavior
in the ERA. This observation gives rise to our main hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. There is less overbidding in ERA than in SPA.
To test for the role of spiteful preferences more directly, subjects face non-strategic decision-
making problems in our computer treatments. Spiteful preferences should not affect their be-
havior in these treatments because a competing player is absent. This gives rise to the following
two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2. There is less overbidding in SPA-C than in SPA.
Hypothesis 3. There is no difference in bidding behavior between ERA-C and ERA.
Overbidding can also be explained by a joy of winning motive (Cooper and Fang, 2008;
Sheremeta, 2010). If subjects derive utility from the mere event of winning, then their optimal
bids should be increased irrespective of the specific treatment:
Hypothesis 4. Higher joy of winning is associated with larger bids in all treatments.
Better cognitive skills might be expected to lead to bidding behavior that is closer to optimal
(Cooper and Fang, 2008), but (i) optimality is determined by the subjects’ preferences and (ii)
the direction of deviation from optimality due to lack of cognitive skills in the different auction
formats is not obvious. We thus have no ex-ante hypothesis about the effect of cognitive skills.
15One participant made an overall loss of CHF 2.50 and paid her dues at the end of the experiment.
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5 Experimental Results
5.1 Bidding Behavior
Figure 2 shows the average overbidding (bid   value in points) in our four treatments. The
leftmost bar indicates that we replicate the well-documented finding that subjects overbid in
second-price auctions (Kagel, 1995). On average, our subjects’ bids exceed their valuations by
5.1 points in SPA, which corresponds to about 10 percent given that the expected valuation is
50.5. In line with Hypothesis 1, Figure 2 also shows that there is no overbidding on average in
ERA. Indeed, on average subjects bid 0.4 points less than their valuation. A Wilcoxon rank-sum
test on matching group averages rejects the null hypothesis that overbidding is the same in SPA
and in ERA (p = 0:0043, one-sided).
Result 1. Average overbidding is significantly lower in ERA than in SPA. On average, there is
no overbidding in ERA, while bids are about 10 percent above valuations in SPA.
Figure 2: Average Overbidding
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Result 1 confirms Hypothesis 1 and is consistent with the idea that spiteful preferences
are a reason for overbidding in the SPA. To test more directly for the contribution of spiteful
preferences to overbidding, we conducted the control treatment SPA-C. Figure 2 reveals that
overbidding amounts to only 1.9 points on average in SPA-C. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test compar-
ing matching group averages in SPA and individual averages in SPA-C rejects the null hypothesis
that overbidding is the same in SPA and in SPA-C (p = 0:0044, one-sided).16
16Recall that for each bidder in SPA-C we have a bidder in SPA with an identical sequence of values and
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Result 2. Average overbidding is significantly lower in SPA-C than in SPA. On average, bids
are only about 4 percent above valuations in SPA-C.
Result 2 confirms Hypothesis 2 and corroborates the idea that spiteful preferences are a
reason for overbidding in the SPA. It also shows that some overbidding persists in SPA-C, even
though bidders do not interact with other bidders in this treatment. This reveals that spite
cannot be the only reason for overbidding. We also conducted the control treatment ERA-C. In
line with Hypothesis 3, Figure 2 shows that average bids in ERA-C are very similar to average
bids in ERA. Average overbidding amounts to 0.08 points in ERA-C. A Wilcoxon rank-sum
test comparing matching group averages in ERA and individual averages in ERA-C does not
reject the null hypothesis that overbidding is the same in ERA and in ERA-C (p = 0:9526,
two-sided).17
Result 3. Average overbidding does not differ between ERA-C and ERA.
While Figure 2 illustrates our main results in a clear way, it hides a considerable variance
in the subjects’ behavior. Figure 3 provides scatter plots showing all individual bids that were
submitted for given values in our four treatments. Dots on the 45-degree line indicate cases
where a bidder submitted a bid that equals her valuation. Dots above (below) the 45-degree
line indicate instances of overbidding (underbidding). In addition to the previously discussed
differences in average overbidding, the scatter plots also show that the variance in bidding
behavior differs between the four treatments. Bids are more dispersed in the externality-robust
auctions than in the second-price auctions. This finding might be due to the trade-off between
the two different concepts of robustness – dominant strategies versus externality-robustness –
mentioned earlier. In a very general FPA setting, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) apply the
concept of interim rationalizability, which rests on the assumption of common knowledge of
rationality but not of correct equilibrium beliefs. They show that, while only truthful bidding
is rationalizable in the SPA with independent private values and selfish bidders, bids both
above and below the Bayes-Nash equilibrium are rationalizable in the corresponding FPA. Hence
dispersion in bidding behavior should be expected in the FPA but not in the SPA when bidders
are rational but do not hold correct equilibrium beliefs. In conjunction with the spite motive, a
opponent bids. We are thus able to group participants in SPA-C into the corresponding matching groups.
Assigning matching groups in SPA-C is artificial as there is no interaction between subjects, but it provides for
a conservative test. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing matching group averages in SPA and SPA-C yields
p = 0:0076, one-sided.
17The same result prevails if we consider averages in the artificial matching groups in ERA-C and compare
them to the matching group averages in ERA (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0:9372, two-sided).
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Figure 3: Scatter Plots
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similar reasoning might explain why average overbidding is smaller but the variance is larger in
the ERA than in the SPA.18
5.2 Efficiency and Revenue
We can also compare the efficiency and the seller’s revenue of the SPA and the ERA. The data
reveal that the allocation is ex-post efficient (i.e., the bidder with the highest valuation receives
the good) in 89.3 percent of the cases (750 out of 840) in SPA and in 90.1 percent of the cases
18The scatter plots also reveal a tendency of more overbidding for small values and more underbidding for
large values in treatment ERA and, to a lesser extent, also in ERA-C. We have no simple explanation for this
observation, but it would be interesting to see if it is consistent with or even predicted by rationalizability.
Deriving the rationalizable bidding strategies for the ERA is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
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(757 out of 840) in ERA. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test on matching group averages reveals that the
null hypothesis that the efficiency is the same in SPA and ERA cannot be rejected (p = 0:5745,
two-sided).
With regard to the seller’s revenue, we find that a seller receives 38.04 on average in SPA
(average price paid by the winning bidder), while a seller receives only 34.04 in ERA (average
price paid by the winning bidder minus bonus payments to both bidders). A Wilcoxon rank-sum
test on matching group averages rejects the null hypothesis that the revenue is the same in SPA
and in ERA with marginal significance (p = 0:0547, two-sided). The higher revenue in SPA
than in ERA reflects the fact that subjects overbid on average in SPA but not in ERA.19
5.3 Individual Determinants of Bidding Behavior
In order to better understand the individual heterogeneity in bidding behavior, we rely on our
measures of joy of winning and cognitive skills. Figure 4 shows the distribution of these two
measures over all four treatments. The left panel shows the distribution of the Raven test scores.
On average subjects solved 7.9 puzzles, the modal value is 9. Very few subjects could solve all
twelve puzzles (5 out of 272 subjects). The right panel reveals that, while subjects spent about
8 points on average to win the contest against the computer, about 30 percent of the subjects
spent nothing. Almost 20 percent of the subjects spent 10 points and about 7 percent spent all
20 points. We cannot exclude that some of these decisions are due to a lack of understanding of
the contest. The two measures are in fact negatively correlated: subjects who score higher in the
cognitive skill task spend less money to win the contest against the computer. The correlation
is not very strong ( =  0:17) but highly significant (p = 0:005).
We elicited a measure of joy of winning because it is one explanation for overbidding discussed
in the literature (e.g. Cooper and Fang, 2008). Regression (1) in Table 2 includes all observations
from SPA and SPA-C and reports a fully interacted random effects regression of overbidding on
period, joy of winning, and cognitive skills. We also control for value, value squared, value cubed,
and the respective interactions, because the deviation of a bid from value can depend on the
underlying value. The regression shows that our measure of joy of winning is indeed positively
associated with overbidding in SPA. While the size of the coefficient is large (a subject who
spends all 20 points in the joy of winning contest is predicted to overbid 4.72 points more than
19With externalities from cross-shareholdings rather than from spitefulness, revenues should instead be lower
in the SPA than in the ERA. An experimental test of this hypothesis could provide further evidence for the
impact of externalities on bidding behavior.
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Figure 4: Individual Characteristics
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a subject who spends no points), it is not significant. An F-test however rejects the hypothesis
that the sum of the coefficients “Joy” and “Joy x C” is zero, i.e., joy of winning has a significant
impact on overbidding in SPA-C (p = 0:0323). Model (4) provides the equivalent regression for
ERA and ERA-C. Again, both coefficients of the joy of winning measure are positive, but small
in ERA and large and significant only in ERA-C (F-test on the hypothesis that “Joy” plus “Joy
x C” equal zero, p = 0:0025). In sum, our data provide weak support for Hypothesis 4 according
to which joy of winning should be associated with higher bids.
Result 4. Joy of winning is positively correlated with overbidding in all four treatments, but the
effect is significant only in SPA-C and ERA-C.
In a common value auction experiment, van den Bos et al. (2008) find that overbidding
and the winner’s curse disappear when subjects play against the computer instead of human
bidders. They explain this finding with the hypothesis that subjects experience joy of winning
only when winning against human bidders. The results of our private value auction experiment
are not consistent with this hypothesis. With joy of winning against humans but not against the
computer, we should expect to find a difference in overbidding between ERA and ERA-C, similar
to the difference that we find between SPA and SPA-C. Since this is not the case, the difference
in average overbidding between SPA and SPA-C cannot be explained by the hypothesis that joy
of winning depends on the existence of a human opponent, but is consistent with the hypothesis
of spiteful preferences.
Regressions (1) and (4) also control for a subject’s cognitive skills, because overbidding in
second-price auctions (and other auction formats) is often attributed to bounded rationality
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Table 2: Regression Analysis
SP ER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Over- Positive Negative Over- Positive Negative
Dep. Variable bidding deviation deviation bidding deviation deviation
Joy 0.236 0.207 -0.029 0.012 0.020 0.008
(0.182) (0.177) (0.046) (0.123) (0.058) (0.079)
Joy x C 0.018 0.087 0.070 0.363** 0.355*** -0.008
(0.217) (0.213) (0.070) (0.175) (0.098) (0.111)
Cog. Skills -1.683** -1.821** -0.138 0.083 0.023 -0.060
(0.748) (0.773) (0.137) (0.392) (0.221) (0.266)
Cog. Skills x C 1.405* 1.350* -0.055 0.066 -0.137 -0.203
(0.786) (0.817) (0.193) (0.559) (0.312) (0.379)
Period 0.021 -0.012 -0.034*** -0.037 -0.070*** -0.033
(0.025) (0.024) (0.008) (0.033) (0.027) (0.027)
Period x C 0.045 -0.019 -0.064* 0.090 0.067 -0.023
(0.053) (0.038) (0.035) (0.079) (0.056) (0.054)
Constant 19.347*** 20.537*** 1.216 12.151*** 13.257*** 1.099
(6.710) (7.064) (1.440) (4.497) (2.873) (2.702)
Constant x C -17.972** -16.464** 1.483 -3.106 -0.624 2.490
(7.512) (7.815) (2.091) (5.884) (3.935) (3.515)
Contr. for value yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.21 0.23 0.04 0.17 0.26 0.10
No. Obs. 3216 3216 3216 3312 3312 3312
No. Clusters 70 70 70 74 74 74
Notes: The table reports random effects regressions, with subject random effect. Standard errors
in parentheses control for clustering at the matching group level in SPA and ERA (6 clusters
each) and at the subject level in SPA-C (64 clusters) and ERA-C (68 clusters). Recall that no
interaction between subjects occurs in the computer treatments. The omitted category is SPA
in regressions (1)-(3) and ERA in (4)-(6), and the interaction is with the respective computer
treatment. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
(Kagel and Levin, 1993; Goeree et al., 2002; Cooper and Fang, 2008). Regression (1) confirms
that cognitive skills are a significant predictor of bidding behavior in SPA: subjects who score
higher in the Raven test show less overbidding. The size of the effect is large. Each additionally
solved puzzle is associated with a reduction in overbidding by about 1.7 points. For SPA-C
we find that cognitive skills are much less associated with overbidding, which can be seen by
the positive and significant interaction term of cognitive skills and the computer treatment. An
F-test cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients “Cog. Skills” and “Cog. Skills
x C” is zero (p = 0:2500). The much smaller association of cognitive skills with overbidding is,
at first sight, a surprising finding, because there is no apparent reason why SPA-C should be
cognitively less demanding than SPA. Moreover, regression (4) shows that cognitive skills are
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not significantly associated with overbidding in ERA and ERA-C either (an F-test cannot reject
that the sum of “Cog. Skills” and “Cog. Skills x C” equals zero, p = 0:7094). Again, there is no
apparent reason why these auction formats should be cognitively less demanding than SPA. In-
terestingly, prior research documented a relation between cognitive skills measured by the Raven
test and different forms of pro-social behavior. Burks et al. (2009) find a positive relationship
between Raven test scores and cooperative behavior in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma game.
Similarly, Millet and Dewitte (2007) find that cognitive skills measured by the Raven test are
positively correlated with altruistic behavior in public goods and dictator games.20 Our finding
that cognitive skills are significantly and negatively associated with overbidding in SPA (where
spiteful preferences predict overbidding) but not in SPA-C, ERA, and ERA-C (where spiteful
preferences do not predict overbidding), together with the existing empirical results linking low
cognitive skills to less pro-social behavior, suggests that low cognitive skills are not necessar-
ily the ultimate reason for overbidding in SPA. Rather, they might instead serve as a proxy
for spiteful preferences (which can be classified as non-cooperative and non-altruistic) in our
analysis.
Further support for this possibility is provided by regressions (2) and (3), were the depen-
dent variables are “positive deviation” and “negative deviation,” respectively. Positive deviation
equals overbidding if overbidding is positive, and is zero otherwise. Negative deviation equals
the absolute value of overbidding if overbidding is negative, and is zero otherwise. These regres-
sions provide two interesting observations. First, cognitive skills are negatively and significantly
associated with positive deviations of bids from value but not with negative deviations in SPA.
This is consistent with the idea that cognitive skills are a proxy for spiteful preferences, while a
bounded rationality argument might predict that low cognitive skills are associated with both
positive and negative deviations of bids from value. Second, the significant negative coefficient
of “Period” reveals that negative deviations decline over time in SPA. This suggests that subjects
learn to some extent not to underbid. Positive deviations, in contrast, do not decline over time.
This is again consistent with a preference explanation for overbidding.21
20Using different measures of cognitive skills, James (2011) reports a positive relationship between cognitive
skills and charitable giving. Segal and Hershberger (1999) find that IQ is positively correlated with cooperation
among twins in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma. The meta study by Jones (2008) reveals that cooperation rates
in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma are higher at universities whose students score higher in standardized cognitive
tests. It should be noted that there is also evidence linking higher cognitive skills to less pro-social behavior. For
example, Ben-Ner et al. (2004) find a negative relationship between their measure of cognitive skills and dictator
game giving (but only for women). Brandstätter and Güth (2002), however, find no effect of cognitive skills on
behavior in dictator and ultimatum games.
21In SPA-C, the effect of period is qualitatively the same as in SPA, with a significant decrease of negative
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6 Conclusions
The behavioral economics literature established a range of behavioral phenomena over the last
decades. The implications of these phenomena for the design of economic institutions have be-
come the focus of the emerging field of behavioral mechanism design theory (e.g. Glazer and
Rubinstein, 1998; Eliaz, 2002; Cabrales and Serrano, 2011; Bierbrauer and Netzer, 2012; de Clip-
pel, 2012). We contribute to this literature by proposing and testing a selling mechanism, the
externality-robust auction, which removes payoff externalities arising from spitefulness, inequal-
ity aversion, or other types of interdependent preferences. Our concept of robustness also covers
non-behavioral interdependencies such as cross-shareholdings between competing firms.
The externality-robust auction can also be seen as an experimental tool. Since it eliminates
the channel through which spiteful preferences manifest themselves in equilibrium behavior,
a comparison of the second-price auction and its externality-robust counterpart helps disen-
tangling different behavioral motivations that might jointly determine bidding in experimental
auctions, such as spitefulness, joy of winning, and bounded rationality. In particular, our exper-
imental evidence corroborates the idea that spiteful preferences are an important determinant
of overbidding in the second-price auction.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We prove the proposition in three steps, fixing a bidder i 2 I with valuation i = k for some
k 2 f1; : : : ;mg throughout. First, we derive an expression for V i (i) := E i [qi (i;  i) i],
followed by an analogous expression for TSPAi (i) := E i

tSPAi (i;  i)

. Finally, these results
will be combined to derive tERAi () = V

i (i) + T
SPA
i (i)  qi () i according to (3).
Step 1. Given i = k, the probability that exactly x other bidders also have valuation k, while
all remaining bidders have a strictly smaller valuation, so that i 2W () and jW ()j = x+ 1, is

n  1
x

pk
x 
P k 1
n 1 x
for any 0  x  n  1.22 According to (1), qi () is non-zero only when i 2W (), so that
V i (i) =
n 1X
x=0

n  1
x

pk
x 
P k 1
n 1 x k
x+ 1

: (8)
22With the convention 00 = 1 this expression is also applicable to the case of x = n  1 and k = 1.
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Step 2. Similarly, the transfers (2) for bidder i are non-zero only when i 2 W (). In that case,
observe that s() = k when jW ()j > 1 and s() < k when jW ()j = 1. Thus
TSPAi (i) =  

P k 1
n 1
Sk  
n 1X
x=1

n  1
x

pk
x 
P k 1
n 1 x k
x+ 1

;
where Sk denotes the expected largest valuation among all n 1 other bidders, conditional on all
of them remaining strictly below k. The first term captures the case where i is the unique bidder
with largest valuation, while the second term captures the possibility that x 2 f1; : : : ; n   1g
other bidders might have the same largest valuation. An expression for Sk will be derived next.
Denote by P^ j = P j=P k 1 the cumulated probabilities of the distribution truncated at k 1, for
j 2 f0; 1; : : : ; k   1g.23 Using standard results about order statistics, the probability that the
largest valuation among the n 1 other bidders is equal to j , conditional on all their valuations
being strictly below k, is given by

P^ j
n 1   P^ j 1n 1 =  P jn 1    P j 1n 1
(P k 1)n 1
:
Hence it is possible to write
Sk =
k 1X
j=1
" 
P j
n 1    P j 1n 1
(P k 1)n 1
#
j :
Collecting results, we obtain
TSPAi (i) =
 
k 1X
j=1
h 
P j
n 1    P j 1n 1i j   n 1X
x=1

n  1
x

pk
x 
P k 1
n 1 x k
x+ 1

: (9)
Step 3. Adding (8) and (9) yields
B(i) := V

i (i) + T
SPA
i (i) =

P k 1
n 1
k  
k 1X
j=1
h 
P j
n 1    P j 1n 1i j :
The function B(i) can be simplified using a recursive formulation. When i = 1, so that k = 1,
it follows immediately that B(1) = 0. Furthermore, for any l 2 f1; : : : ;m  1g it follows after
23With the convention 0=0 = 0 this expression is also applicable to the case of k = 1.
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some simplifications that
B(l+1) B(l) =

P l
n 1 
l+1   l

:
Thus, for i = k it is possible to write
B(i) =
k 1X
j=1
 
P j
n 1  
j+1   j ;
which is expression (5) in Proposition 1. It now follows that
tERAi () = V

i (i) + T
SPA
i (i)  qi () i = B(i)  qi () i:
Using (1), this becomes expression (4) in the proposition.
A.2 Ex-Post Revenues in the ERA
Condition (6) is most stringent for m. Consider revenue k nB(k). Straightforward calcula-
tions reveal that an increase from k to k+1 changes this expression by [1 n(P k)n 1](k+1 k),
the sign of which is equal to the sign of [1   n(P k)n 1]. This latter expression is strictly de-
creasing in k, so whenever revenue has become smaller in response to an increased k, further
increases in k will continue to reduce the revenue. Now observe that (6) is satisfied for k = 1,
because B(1) = 0. Therefore, whenever a deficit occurs for some larger k – which requires that
revenue has eventually decreased – then a deficit also occurs for all k0 > k. To rule out deficits,
it is therefore enough to check condition (6) for the largest value m.
Condition (7) holds in the framework of Section 2.4. In this case, (7) can be rearranged to
n
m 1X
j=1
(j)n 1  mn: (10)
Fix arbitrary values of n  2 and m  2 and assume that (10) is satisfied. Then it must also be
satisfied for all values m0 > m, holding n fixed. Indeed, increasing m by one increases the LHS
of the inequality by n (m)n 1 and the RHS by (m+1)n mn. An immediate application of the
binomial theorem reveals that (m+1)n mn = n (m)n 1+, where  summarizes all remaining
terms and is positive. Hence increasing m slackens (10). For the smallest possible value m = 2,
(10) simplifies to n  2n, which is satisfied for all n  2.
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A.3 Experimental Instructions
A.3.1 Instructions for SPA
General Instructions for Bidders: We are pleased to welcome you to this economic study.
If you read the following instructions carefully, you can earn money in addition to the 10 Swiss
francs that you receive as an initial endowment for participating. The exact amount depends
on your decisions and those of the other participants. It is thus very important that you read
these instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please contact us. During the study, we
will not speak of francs, but of points. Your entire income will thus first be calculated in points.
The points you earn during the study will be converted to Swiss francs at the end of the study.
The following conversion rate applies: 4 points = 1 Swiss franc. At the end of today’s study,
you will receive the number of points earned during the study plus the initial endowment of
10 Swiss francs in cash. We will explain the exact procedure of the study on the next pages.
For the sake of simplicity, we will always use male forms for participants; we obviously include
female participants in any case.
The Study: This study lasts for 24 periods. All participants are in the roll of bidders. In each
period, two bidders are randomly assigned to a group of two. An auction takes place in each of
these groups of two; in the auction, one of the two bidders can purchase a commodity by paying
a price. No real commodities are purchased in this study. The “purchase of a commodity” means
that the winner of the auction receives a number of points corresponding to the value of the
commodity to him which is credited to his account. The price of the commodity will also be
determined in points and deducted from the winner’s account. The value of a commodity for
a bidder will be randomly determined in each period. The value can be any integer between 1
and 100, where every value is equally probable. The value of the commodity for the two bidders
in a group of two is thus typically variously large. Each bidder only knows the value that the
commodity has for him but not the value that the commodity has for the other bidder. The
procedure in a period:
1. First, each bidder learns the value that the commodity has for him in the current period
(but not the value of the commodity for the other bidder).
2. Each bidder then places his bid for the commodity. The placement of the bids takes place
simultaneously. A bidder thus does not know the other bidder’s bid for the time being.
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3. The bidder in the group of two who makes the higher bid wins the auction and receives the
commodity. If both bidders make the same bid, random chance (with the same probability
for each bidder) determines who wins the auction.
4. The price that the winner of the auction must pay for the commodity corresponds to the
losing bidder’s bid.
5. At the end of a period, the payment of the bidder who won the auction is: Payment =
own value of commodity – the losing bidder’s bid. The payment of the bidder who did not
win the auction is: Payment = 0.
Examples: Bidders A and B form a group of two. The value of the commodity for bidder A in
a given period is 20 points. The value of the commodity for bidder B is 60 points in this period.
1. Assume that bidder A makes a bid of 20 points and bidder B makes a bid of 60 points.
Bidder B thus wins the auction, as his bid (60) is higher than that of bidder A (20). The
price that bidder B must pay is bidder A’s bid. The following payments in points thus
result: Payment for bidder A = 0. Payment for bidder B = own value – price (bidder A’s
bid) = 60 – 20 = 40.
2. Now assume that bidder A makes a bid of 18 points and bidder B a bid of 12 points.
Bidder A thus wins the auction, as his bid (18) is higher than that of bidder B (12). The
price that bidder A must pay is bidder B’s bid. The following payments in points thus
result: Payment for bidder A = own value – price (bidder B’s bid) = 20 – 12 = 8. Payment
for bidder B = 0.
3. Now assume that bidder A makes a bid of 68 points and bidder B a bid of 45 points.
Bidder A thus wins the auction, as his bid (68) is higher than that of bidder B (45). The
price bidder A must pay is bidder B’s bid. The following payments in points thus result:
Payment for bidder A = own value – price (bidder B’s bid) = 20 – 45 = –25. Payment for
bidder B = 0.
Please note, as in example 3, that the payment of the bidder who wins the auction can also
be negative. Losses will be compensated with profits from other periods and with the initial
endowment.
Procedure on the Computer: A bidder is informed in each period about the value of the
commodity for him on the screen below. A bidder also places his bid on this screen:
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The upper part of the screen shows the period you are in on the left; in this example, it is period
1 of 24. On the right you see the maximum amount of time you should take for entering your
bid. This time limitation is not binding, however; a bid can also be placed after the time has
expired. The middle part of the screen shows the value that the commodity has for you in the
current period. Here on the example screen, “XX” is shown instead of a value. You enter your
bid in the field directly under the value of the commodity. Any integer between 1 and 100 can
be entered as a bid. In order to confirm a bid, you must click on the “confirm bid” button. You
can change your bid until you click on this button. After both bidders have entered their bids,
it will be determined who won the auction. Both bidders will be informed of the results of the
auction on a screen. Each bidder sees whether he or the other bidder won the auction on the
information screen. A bidder will again see the value of the commodity for him in the period
in question and his bid. He will also learn of the other bidder’s bid (but not of the value of the
commodity to the other bidder). Here is an example of the screen for the bidder who did not
win the auction:
32
The screen for the bidder who won the auctions is equivalent. The next period begins after
all participants have looked at their information screens. Again, two bidders will be randomly
assigned to each other in this period. Your payment at the end of the study is the sum of all
of your payments from four periods that the computer randomly selects. As you do not know
which periods will be randomly selected, you should consider your decisions in each of the 24
periods very carefully. Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We
will come to you at your workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control questions on
the next pages.
Control Questions: The value of the commodity for bidder A amounts to 50 points in all
questions.
1. Bidder A places a bid of 50, and bidder B places a bid of 30. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s payment in this period?
2. Bidder A places a bid of 83, and bidder B places a bid of 18. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s payment in this period?
3. Bidder A places a bid of 100, and bidder B places a bid of 65. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s payment in this period?
4. Bidder A places a bid of 1, and bidder B places a bid of 28. How high is bidder A’s payment
in this period? How high is bidder B’s price in this period? (You can only determine the
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price but not the payment for bidder B, as you do not know the value of the commodity
for bidder B.)
5. Bidder A places a bid of 50, and bidder B places a bid of 75. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s price in this period?
6. Bidder A places a bid of 43, and bidder B places a bid of 24. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s payment in this period?
7. Bidder A places a bid of 72, and bidder B places a bid of 90. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s price in this period?
Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions. We will then come to
you at your workplace.
A.3.2 Instructions for SPA-C
General Instructions for Bidders: [As in SPA]
The Study: This study lasts for 24 periods. All participants are in the roll of bidders. An
auction takes place in each period; in this auction, you as bidder can purchase a commodity by
paying a price. No real commodities are purchased in this study. The “purchase of a commodity”
means that the winner of the auction receives a number of points corresponding to the value of
the commodity to him which is credited to his account. The price of the commodity will also
be determined in points and deducted from the winner’s account. The value of a commodity for
a bidder will be randomly determined in each period. The value can be any integer between 1
and 100, where every value is equally probable. The procedure in a period:
1. You will first learn the value that the commodity has for you in the current period.
2. You then place a bid for the commodity. At the same time, a number between 1 and 100
will be assigned to you. You do not know this number for the time being. (The exact
distribution of the randomly assigned numbers corresponds to the bids that were made in
the past in an identical auction with two bidders.)
3. If your bid is higher than the randomly assigned number, you win the auction and receive
the commodity. If your bid exactly equals the assigned number, random choice (with a
probability of 50%) determines whether you win the auction.
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4. The price that you must pay for the commodity if you win the auction corresponds to the
randomly assigned number.
5. If you win the auction, your payment at the end of the period is: Payment = value of
commodity to you – the randomly assigned number. If you do not win the auction, your
payment is: Payment = 0.
Examples: The value of a commodity for a bidder in a given period is 20 points.
1. Assume that the bidder makes a bid of 20 points and the randomly assigned number is
60. The bidder thus does not win the auction, as his bid (20) is less than the randomly
assigned number (60). The following payments in points thus results: Payment for the
bidder = 0.
2. Now assume that the bidder makes a bid of 18 points and the randomly assigned number is
12. The bidder thus wins the auction, as his bid (18) is higher than the randomly assigned
number (12). The price the bidder must pay is randomly assigned number. The following
payment in points thus results: Payment for the bidder = own value – price (randomly
assigned number) = 20 – 12 = 8.
3. Now assume that the bidder makes a bid of 68 points and the randomly assigned number
is 45. The bidder thus wins the auction, as his bid (68) is higher than the randomly
assigned number (45). The price the bidder must pay is the randomly assigned number.
The following payment in points thus results: Payment for the bidder = own value – price
(randomly assigned number) = 20 – 45 = –25.
Please note, as in example 3, that the payment of the bidder who wins the auction can also
be negative. Losses will be compensated with profits from other periods and with the initial
endowment.
Procedure on the Computer: A bidder is informed in each period about the value of the
commodity for him on the screen below. A bidder also places his bid on this screen:
[Same screen as in SPA]
The upper part of the screen shows the period you are in on the left; in this example, it is period
1 of 24. On the right you see the maximum amount of time you should take for entering your
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bid. This time limitation is not binding, however; a bid can also be placed after the time has
expired. The middle part of the screen shows the value that the commodity has for you in the
current period. Here on the example screen, “XX” is shown instead of a value. You enter your
bid in the field directly under the value of the commodity. Any integer between 1 and 100 can
be entered as a bid. In order to confirm a bid, you must click on the “confirm bid” button. You
can change your bid until you click on this button. After a bidder has entered his bid, it will
be determined whether he won the auction. The bidder will be informed of the results of the
auction on a screen. You will see whether you won the auction on the information screen. You
will again see the value of the commodity for you in the period in question and your bid. He
will also learn of the randomly assigned number. Here is an example of the screen for the bidder
who did not win the auction:
The screen for a bidder who won the auctions is equivalent. The next period begins after all
participants have looked at their information screens. Your payment at the end of the study is
the sum of all of your payments from four periods that the computer randomly selects. As you
do not know which periods will be randomly selected, you should consider your decisions in each
of the 24 periods very carefully. Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your
hand. We will come to you at your workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control
questions on the next pages.
Control questions: The value of the commodity for a bidder amounts to 50 points in all
questions.
36
1. The bidder places a bid of 50, and the randomly assigned number is 30. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
2. The bidder places a bid of 83, and the randomly assigned number is 18. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
3. The bidder places a bid of 100, and the randomly assigned number is 65. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
4. The bidder places a bid of 1, and the randomly assigned number is 28. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
5. The bidder places a bid of 50, and the randomly assigned number is 75. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
6. The bidder places a bid of 43, and the randomly assigned number is 24. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
7. The bidder places a bid of 72, and the randomly assigned number is 90. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions. We will then come to
you at your workplace.
A.3.3 Instructions for ERA
General Instructions for Bidders: [As in SPA]
The Study: This study lasts for 24 periods. All participants are in the roll of bidders. In each
period, two bidders are randomly assigned to a group of two. An auction takes place in each of
these groups of two; in the auction, one of the two bidders can purchase a commodity by paying
a price. No real commodities are purchased in this study. The “purchase of a commodity” means
that the winner of the auction receives a number of points corresponding to the value of the
commodity to him which is credited to his account. The price of the commodity will also be
determined in points and deducted from the winner’s account. The value of a commodity for
a bidder will be randomly determined in each period. The value can be any integer between 1
and 100, where every value is equally probable. The value of the commodity for the two bidders
in a group of two is thus typically variously large. Each bidder only knows the value that the
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commodity has for him but not the value that the commodity has for the other bidder. The
procedure in a period:
1. First, each bidder learns the value that the commodity has for him in the current period
(but not the value of the commodity for the other bidder).
2. Each bidder then places his bid for the commodity. The placement of the bids takes place
simultaneously. A bidder thus does not know the other bidder’s bid for the time being.
3. The bidder in the group of two who makes the higher bid wins the auction and receives the
commodity. If both bidders make the same bid, random chance (with the same probability
for each bidder) determines who wins the auction.
4. The price that the winner of the auction must pay for the commodity corresponds to his
own bid. Furthermore, each bidder receives a bonus payment that only depends on the
own bid. Your bonus payment is higher, the higher your bid is. You can see the exact
amount of the bonus for each bid on the supplementary information sheet.
5. At the end of a period, the payment of the bidder who won the auction is: Payment =
own value of commodity – own bid + bonus payment. The payment of the bidder who did
not win the auction is: Payment = bonus payment.
Examples: Bidders A and B form a group of two. The value of the commodity for bidder A in
a given period is 20 points. The value of the commodity for bidder B is 60 points in this period.
1. Assume that bidder A makes a bid of 20 points and bidder B makes a bid of 60 points.
Bidder B thus wins the auction, as his bid (60) is higher than that of bidder A (20). The
price that bidder B must pay is his own bid. Both bidders also receive a bonus payment
determined by their own bids (see complementary information sheet). The following pay-
ments in points thus result: Payment for bidder A = bonus payment = 1.9. Payment for
bidder B = own value – price (own bid) + bonus payment = 60 – 60 + 17.7 = 17.7.
2. Now assume that bidder A makes a bid of 18 points and bidder B a bid of 12 points. Bidder
A thus wins the auction, as his bid (18) is higher than that of bidder B (12). The price
bidder A must pay is his own bid. Both bidders also receive their own bonus payments.
The following payments in points thus result: Payment for bidder A = own value – price
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(own bid) + bonus payment = 20 – 18 + 1.53 = 3.53. Payment for bidder B = bonus
payment = 0.66.
3. Now assume that bidder A makes a bid of 68 points and bidder B a bid of 45 points. Bidder
A thus wins the auction, as his bid (68) is higher than that of bidder B (45). The price
bidder A must pay is his own bid. Both bidders also receive their own bonus payments.
The following payments in points thus result: Payment for bidder A = own value – price
(own bid) + bonus payment = 20–68+22.78 = –25.22. Payment for bidder B = bonus
payment = 9.9.
Please note, as in example 3, that the payment of the bidder who wins the auction can also
be negative. Losses will be compensated with profits from other periods and with the initial
endowment.
Procedure on the Computer: A bidder is informed in each period about the value of the
commodity for him on the screen below. A bidder also places his bid on this screen:
[Same screen as in SPA]
The upper part of the screen shows the period you are in on the left; in this example, it is period
1 of 24. On the right you see the maximum amount of time you should take for entering your
bid. This time limitation is not binding, however; a bid can also be placed after the time has
expired. The middle part of the screen shows the value that the commodity has for you in the
current period. Here on the example screen, “XX” is shown instead of a value. You enter your
bid in the field directly under the value of the commodity. Any integer between 1 and 100 can
be entered as a bid. In order to confirm a bid, you must click on the “confirm bid” button. You
can change your bid until you click on this button. After both bidders have entered their bids,
it will be determined who won the auction. Both bidders will be informed of the results of the
auction on a screen. Each bidder sees whether he or the other bidder won the auction on the
information screen. A bidder will again see the value of the commodity for him in the period
in question and his bid. He will also learn of the other bidder’s bid (but not of the value of the
commodity to the other bidder). Here is an example of the screen for the bidder who did not
win the auction:
[Same screen as in SPA]
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The screen for the bidder who won the auctions is equivalent. The next period begins after
all participants have looked at their information screens. Again, two bidders will be randomly
assigned to each other in this period. Your payment at the end of the study is the sum of all
of your payments from four periods that the computer randomly selects. As you do not know
which periods will be randomly selected, you should consider your decisions in each of the 24
periods very carefully. Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We
will come to you at your workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control questions on
the next pages.
Control Questions: The value of the commodity for bidder A amounts to 50 points in all
questions.
1. Bidder A places a bid of 50, and bidder B places a bid of 30. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s payment in this period?
2. Bidder A places a bid of 83, and bidder B places a bid of 18. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s payment in this period?
3. Bidder A places a bid of 100, and bidder B places a bid of 65. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s payment in this period?
4. Bidder A places a bid of 1, and bidder B places a bid of 28. How high is bidder A’s payment
in this period? How high is bidder B’s price in this period? (You can only determine the
price but not the payment for bidder B, as you do not know the value of the commodity
for bidder B.)
5. Bidder A places a bid of 50, and bidder B places a bid of 75. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s price in this period?
6. Bidder A places a bid of 43, and bidder B places a bid of 24. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s payment in this period?
7. Bidder A places a bid of 72, and bidder B places a bid of 90. How high is bidder A’s
payment in this period? How high is bidder B’s price in this period?
Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions. We will then come to
you at your workplace.
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A.3.4 Instructions for ERA-C
General Instructions for Bidders: [As in SPA]
The Study: This study lasts for 24 periods. All participants are in the roll of bidders. An
auction takes place in each period; in this auction, you as bidder can purchase a commodity by
paying a price. No real commodities are purchased in this study. The “purchase of a commodity”
means that the winner of the auction receives a number of points corresponding to the value of
the commodity to him which is credited to his account. The price of the commodity will also
be determined in points and deducted from the winner’s account. The value of a commodity for
a bidder will be randomly determined in each period. The value can be any integer between 1
and 100, where every value is equally probable. The procedure in a period:
1. You will first learn the value that the commodity has for you in the current period.
2. You then place a bid for the commodity. At the same time, a number between 1 and 100
will be assigned to you. You do not know this number for the time being. (The exact
distribution of the randomly assigned numbers corresponds to the bids that were made in
the past in an identical auction with two bidders.)
3. If your bid is higher than the randomly assigned number, you win the auction and receive
the commodity. If your bid exactly equals the assigned number, random choice (with a
probability of 50%) determines whether you win the auction.
4. The price that you must pay for the commodity if you win the auction corresponds to your
own bid. Furthermore, you receive a bonus payment that only depends on your own bid.
Your bonus payment is higher, the higher your bid is. You can see the exact amount of
the bonus for each bid on the supplementary information sheet.
5. If you win the auction, your payment at the end of the period is: Payment = value of
commodity to you – your bid + bonus payment. If you do not win the auction, your
payment is: Payment = bonus payment.
Examples: The value of a commodity for a bidder in a given period is 20 points.
1. Assume that the bidder makes a bid of 20 points and the randomly assigned number is
60. The bidder thus does not win the auction, as his bid (20) is less than the randomly
assigned number (60). He receives a bonus payment, however, determined by his own bid
41
(see complementary information sheet). The following payments in points thus results:
Payment for the bidder = bonus payment = 1.9.
2. Now assume that the bidder makes a bid of 18 points and the randomly assigned number is
12. The bidder thus wins the auction, as his bid (18) is higher than the randomly assigned
number (12). The price the bidder must pay is his own bid. He also receives his bonus
payments. The following payment in points thus results: Payment for the bidder = own
value – price (own bid) + bonus payment = 20 – 18 + 1.53 = 3.53.
3. Now assume that the bidder makes a bid of 68 points and the randomly assigned number is
45. The bidder thus wins the auction, as his bid (68) is higher than the randomly assigned
number (45). The price the bidder must pay is his own bid. He also receives his bonus
payments. The following payment in points thus results: Payment for the bidder = own
value – price (own bid) + bonus payment = 20–68+22.78 = –25.22.
Please note, as in example 3, that the payment of the bidder who wins the auction can also
be negative. Losses will be compensated with profits from other periods and with the initial
endowment.
Procedure on the Computer: A bidder is informed in each period about the value of the
commodity for him on the screen below. A bidder also places his bid on this screen:
[Same screen as in SPA]
The upper part of the screen shows the period you are in on the left; in this example, it is period
1 of 24. On the right you see the maximum amount of time you should take for entering your
bid. This time limitation is not binding, however; a bid can also be placed after the time has
expired. The middle part of the screen shows the value that the commodity has for you in the
current period. Here on the example screen, “XX” is shown instead of a value. You enter your
bid in the field directly under the value of the commodity. Any integer between 1 and 100 can
be entered as a bid. In order to confirm a bid, you must click on the “confirm bid” button. You
can change your bid until you click on this button. After a bidder has entered his bid, it will
be determined whether he won the auction. The bidder will be informed of the results of the
auction on a screen. You will see whether you won the auction on the information screen. You
will again see the value of the commodity for you in the period in question and your bid. He
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will also learn of the randomly assigned number. Here is an example of the screen for the bidder
who did not win the auction:
[Same screen as in SPA-C]
The screen for a bidder who won the auctions is equivalent. The next period begins after all
participants have looked at their information screens. Your payment at the end of the study is
the sum of all of your payments from four periods that the computer randomly selects. As you
do not know which periods will be randomly selected, you should consider your decisions in each
of the 24 periods very carefully. Do you have any further questions? If yes, please raise your
hand. We will come to you at your workplace. Otherwise, we ask you to answer the control
questions on the next pages.
Control Questions: The value of the commodity for a bidder amounts to 50 points in all
questions.
1. The bidder places a bid of 50, and the randomly assigned number is 30. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
2. The bidder places a bid of 83, and the randomly assigned number is 18. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
3. The bidder places a bid of 100, and the randomly assigned number is 65. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
4. The bidder places a bid of 1, and the randomly assigned number is 28. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
5. The bidder places a bid of 50, and the randomly assigned number is 75. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
6. The bidder places a bid of 43, and the randomly assigned number is 24. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
7. The bidder places a bid of 72, and the randomly assigned number is 90. How high is the
bidder’s payment in this period?
Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions. We will then come to
you at your workplace.
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